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3We (mankind) are facing
• Huge dangers!
• Great opportunities!
• At the same time!
4Compared to 100 yrs ago
• The danger that the whole of mankind may 
become extinct within either 100 yrs or 1,000 
yrs has increased by at least 10 times.
• Nuclear wars, global warming, other 
environmental disasters, misuse of technology 
(e.g. nanotechnology), etc.
5But, if we managed to avoid extinction
• Almost certainly (>99%) increase our welfare 
(net happiness) by >100 times in 100 yrs, and 
>1,000 times in 1,000 yrs!
• By brain stimulation (BS) of 
pleasure centres.
• By genetic engineering (GE).
• Expected welfare still higher.
6We are at the cross road of
• Jumping into Hell (extinction)
• Leaping into Heaven (bliss).
• 跳下地狱？走上天堂？
人类面临灭亡与极乐十字路口
• The huge difference never been bigger.
7The fruits of
• BS could be achieved in 5 yrs,
• from the start of a project to 
promote its widespread use.
• GE within 10‐100 yrs.
8• Positive reward of BS was discovered by Olds 
and Milner (1954) .
• Rats willing to cross a painful shock grid to 
obtain BS.
• pleasure so intense, rats prefer BS to food and 
sex, and if not stopped, will seek stimulation til
exhaustion. 
• Humans, ‘patients [with] emotional or physical 
pain experienced such intense pleasure with 
stimulation that the pain was obliterated’
(Heath, John and Fontana 1968, p.188).
9BS as a ‘primer’ of well‐being
• Heath (1964, p.236) reported, ‘strong 
pleasure [from brain stimulation] was 
associated with sexual feelings, and in most 
instances the patient experienced 
spontaneous orgasm … This patient, now 
married to her third husband, had never 
experienced orgasm before she received …
stimulation to the brain, but since then has 
consistently achieved climax during sexual 
relations.’
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Solving social problems
• Social problems as drug addiction, crimes and 
(mental) depression, etc. largely solvable with 
the widespread use of BS. 
• In comparison to BS, the use of addictive 
drugs like heroin is a very inefficient and 
dangerous method of achieving a ‘high’. 
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Addiction?
• BS addiction is not dangerous to health. 
• Strong evidence: proper use (Patterson and 
Kesner 1981) of BS over a sustained period for 
a long time (few hours daily over years) has 
proved quite safe. (See also Bolognini， et al. 
2009，Deuschl, et al. 2006，Lozano, et al. 
2008, Weaver, et al. 2009, Nitsche, et al. 2008, 
Wassermann， et al. 2008.) 
• Limit use to 7‐10pm?
12
• Rats choose to use EBS until exhaustion but 
humans only for “up to half an hour daily”
(Sem‐Jacobsen, in Delgado 1976, p.484). 
• Relative to other pleasures and objectives, the 
pleasure of BS not compelling for humans 
(Bishop, Elder and Heath, 1964; Valenstein, 
1973, p.28). 
• Perhaps God made us this way so we could 
eventually provide happiness not only for 
ourselves but also for animals.
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Beauty of BS
• 1. No loss of novelty value 
like TV, etc.
• 2. No diminishing marginal 
utility.
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Unnatural?
• 300 yrs ago: sitting in the living 
room for hours looking at the 
shadows in a box.
• All civilized things are ‘unnatural’.
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Will God approve BS?
• If I were God, I would want my 
creatures to enjoy.
• No commandment against BS.
• If not why create us this way?
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•详见财经网，黄有光博客：
• http://blog.caijing.com.cn/ 
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Genetic Engineering
• 主要增加粮产, 医药治疗 .
• 长期：改造我们自己。
• 快乐水平大致基因决定。
• 多消费不能增加快乐，乐极生悲.
• 选择乐观、外向等基因。
• 直接减低痛苦，提高快乐水平；
• 改良健康，提高智力，延长寿命。
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Yes, have to be very careful
• With sufficient safeguard, the danger of 
extinction or comparable disasters <
• The danger of extinction of ‘business as usual’
without serious attempts to address 
environmental protection
• The difference of benefits are many 
thousands times!
19
Huge happiness potential
• Should increase our willingness to 
sacrifice current consumption to 
safeguard our survival.
• A point missed by current environmental 
economics which concentrates on
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Consumption Tradeoff
• Stern 2007 Review, Nordhaus 2007 and Weitzman 
2007 JEL reviews, Cole 2008, Dietz & Stern 2008, 
Sterner & Persson 2008, Heal 2009, etc. emphasizes 
the discount rate.
• A million dollars 200 years from now has a present 
value of $59,618 discounted at 1.4% p.a. (used in 
the Stern Review);
• Only $35 discounted at 5% (a rate commonly used);
• A difference of 1,700 times!  Reject Stern?
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vs. Catastrophes Avoidance
• Focusing on the more important issue of 
catastrophes avoidance, urgent and strong 
actions may well be justified more.
• Happiness studies and technological advances 
reinforce the need for strong actions.
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Ramsey’s approach
• maximizes social welfare or the utility of a 
representative individual through time to 
infinity as a function of the consumption level 
of the contemporaneous period only. 
• Ramsey’s equation for the discount rate r:
• r = δ + ηg
• where δ = rate of pure time preference, η =  
elasticity of marginal utility (% decrease in MU 
as consumption ↑ by 1%), and g = per capita 
growth rate of consumption. 
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Time preference
• An individual may be 
myopic/impatient/irrational and has a positive 
pure time preference.
• Global warming: perspective is the whole 
society for both the present and future.
• Impartiality requires: welfare of future people 
treated similarly to the present (Ng 2005).
• No pure time preference should be entailed.
• A valid reason for δ to be positive. 
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Future utility is less certain
• A discount rate to reflect this uncertainty is 
fully justified even with impartiality between 
the present and the future (Ng 2005). 
• “Intergenerational impartiality: Replacing 
discounting by probability weighting”, Journal 
of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 
2005, 18(3), pp 237-57.
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What rate?
• The Stern Review adopts an annual uncertainty 
discount rate δ = 0.1%. 
• Many regard this rate as being too low or prefer 
using higher rates. (See, e.g. Nordhaus 1994, 
2007; Quiggin, forthcoming; Yohe 2006. A rate 
of δ as high as 3% has been suggested.)
• In my view, as the (constant, for simplicity) rate 
of pure survival uncertainty, the rate of δ = 0.1% 
is VERY excessive. 
• Should be at least ten times smaller: δ < 0.01%. 
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Annual Risk of Extinction
and Survival Probability
Probability of Annual value of δ
Survival till 
next
δ = 1% δ = 0.1% δ = 0.01%
100 years 36.6% 90.48% 99.005%
1,000 years 0.004% 36.77% 90.48%
2,000 years (10-6) ∙ 0.186% 13.52% 81.87%
5,000 years (10-19) ∙ 0.15% 0.672% 60.65%
8,000 years (10-32) ∙ 0.12% 0.0334% 44.93%
10,000 years (10-41) ∙
0.225%
0.004517% 36.79%
100,000 years Virtually zero (10-41) x 0.35385 % 0.0045377%
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Our history 
• Earth: 4.5 billion years.
• Life on earth: 3.5 - 4 billion years.
• Mammals: 200 million years ago.
• Primates: 40 million years.
• Great apes: 15 million. 
• Homo: 2.5 million years. 
• Homo sapiens: half a million years. 
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An important distinction.
• The higher probability of extinction due to 
factor (such as celestial collision) unrelated to 
global warming should increase our uncertainty 
discount rate δ and hence decrease our 
willingness to sacrifice our present consumption 
for future benefits.
• The higher probability of extinction due to 
global warming itself should increase our 
willingness to sacrifice our present consumption 
to avoid or reduce global warming.
• Because our sacrifice will help to reduce the 
probabilities of extinction. 
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• For measures that help to reduce/avoid 
catastrophes, δ should not be taken as given.
• Largely ignored in most analyses.
• If δ is taken as given, the problem is simply 
intertemporal consumption trade-off. Then, the 
higher the uncertainty discount rate δ, the less 
willing we should be to sacrifice current 
consumption for future consumption.
30
Ramsey’s equation for discounting
• r = δ + ηg
• η =  elasticity of marginal utility (% decrease 
in MU as consumption ↑ by 1%),
• Diminishing marginal utility → the higher the 
consumption level, the lower MU. The higher 
growth rate g, the higher will future 
consumption be higher than the present one.
• Thus, ηg gives how much lower MU of 
consumption is less than that of a year before. 
[intertemporal comparability and unchanged 
utility function]. 
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What values?
• The Stern Review takes δ = 0.1%, η = 1, and 
g = 2%, giving a discount rate of r = 2.1%.
• Most commentators regard this as too small.
• Nordhaus (2007, p. 694) prefers a rate of 5.5% 
(from δ = 1.5%, η = 2, and g = 2%);
• Weitzman (2007, p. 707) prefers a rate of 6% 
( ‘a trio of twos’, i.e. δ = 2%, η = 2, g = 2%).
• As an uncertainty discount, even δ = 0.1% is 
excessively high. 
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η = 1; too low
• total utility goes to infinity as 
consumption does. Obviously impossible 
as no one is capable of infinite happiness 
no matter how high is consumption, due to 
biological limitations. 
• Weitzman (2007, p. 707) finds η = 3 
reasonable. This, even with δ = 0, still 
gives r = 6% (with g = 2%). 
• Is g = 2% reasonable?
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Table 2
The number of times future output will be larger
After
Annual g = 1% Annual g = 2%
100 years 2.7048 7.245
200 years 7.316 52.485
500 years 144.77 19,956.57
1,000 years 20,959.16 108∙ 3.98265
2,000 years 108∙ 4.39286 1017∙ 1.58615
5,000 years 1021∙ 4.04454 1043∙ 1.00198
10,000 years 1043∙ 1.63583 1086∙ 1.003963
20,000 years 1086∙ 2.676 10172∙ 1.00794
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• Growth may consist in services and leisure.
• Still, with productivity in the order of 10 to the power 
172 times that of our current one implies that a single 
worker would be able to produce the value of output 
many quintillion times more than the value of the 
weight of the whole universe in gold in less than a tiny 
fraction of a second! 
• Optimist as I am, I do not think that this would ever be 
possible, not to say in 20,000 years from now. Thus, 
economic growth may be at the level of 2-3% for 
many more decades; it must eventually slow down. 
Taking g = 2% indefinitely is thus misleading. 
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• Some truncate the time horizon, looking say at 
only the next one or two hundred years.
• Though the probability that we will survive 
more than two hundred years should be much 
higher than 50%, this simplification is not too 
misleading, if the problem is just that of 
intertemporal consumption tradeoff, especially 
if the discount rate is around or more than the 
more common value of about 5%.
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• A stream of value worth $100 in real terms from 
the year 201 every year through to infinity, 
discounted at 5%, has only a present value of 
$0.1156 in total! 
• This underlines the misleading nature of focusing 
on intertemporal consumption tradeoff for 
problems like global warming that have long-
lasting effects and that may lead to catastrophic 
outcomes threatening our very survival. 
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• Weitzman (2007) correctly mentions that, 
in dealing with global warming, the 
expected growth rate should have ‘a thick 
left tail’ (p.718);
• but acknowledges that ‘we lack a usable 
economic framework for dealing with 
these kinds of thick-tailed extreme 
disasters’ (p.723). Weitzman (2009). 
• The next section outlines a method in 
dealing with such catastrophes. 
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Towards an Economic Analysis of 
Catastrophes Avoidance
• Nearly two decades ago, I discussed ‘decisions 
(e.g. ... environmental protection…) that may 
affect the probabilities of the continued 
survival of the human race’ (Ng 1991, p.79).
• “Should We Be Very Cautious or Extremely 
Cautious on Measures that May Involve Our 
Destruction?  On the Finiteness of Our 
Expected Welfare”, Social Choice and Welfare, 
1991, 8(1): 79-88.
39
• Traditional economics, especially with the 
insistence on ordinal utility, cannot 
analyse catastrophes
• Which requires the comparisons of total 
utilities/welfares with marginal utilities.
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3 Methods
• 1. Estimate willingness to pay to reduce 
risk of death by observing actual choices.
• 2. By asking people.
• 3. From postulated cardinal 
utility/happiness functions.
• Economists skeptical of the last two.
• Behavioural economics. 
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Happiness studies
• Results in happiness studies provide 
some clues.
• Suggest high value of total utilities 
relative to marginal utilities.
• Hence justities immediate and strong 
actions to reduce global warming.
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Crux of the difference
• Consumption in the far future very 
unimportant as r should be large (5%).
• Very important to avoid/reduce 
catastrophes as expected future welfare 
(total utility) very high,
• And pure uncertainty discount δ
should be very low (< 0.01%).
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An Illustration
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• “Business as usual”: EU1 = 151.34 + 
97.24 + 3,208.87 = 3,458.45
• Consumption trade-off only: EU2 = 
131.18 + 94.24 + 3,211.33 = 3,316.75
• Catastrophes reduction: EU3 = 126.04 + 
93.87 + 9,751.07 = 9.860.98.
• Potential strong support for immediate and 
strong actions at environmental protection.
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Future Technological Advances
• Such as brain stimulation, genetic 
engineering discussed above
• That may lead to quantum leaps in 
our welfare
• Further reinforce the results of 
happiness studies.
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May we save ourselves from our 
own destruction!
Thank you!
•刺激大脑，享受人生极乐；
•改良基因，打开生死玄关。
